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ACCOUNTING FOR EMISSIONS TRADING: 
HOW ALLOWANCES APPEAR ON FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS COULD INFLUENCE THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF PROGRAMS  
TO CURB POLLUTION 
Laura E. Souchik* 
Abstract: Cap-and-trade programs to curb carbon emissions frequently 
rely on the use of tradable emissions credits known as “allowances.” To 
date, companies' presentations of their usage of these allowances on their 
financial statements has not been uniform. Cap-and-trade programs will 
be most effective when presentation of allowances on financial statements 
is standardized, since all companies will be forced to be transparent about 
their methods of compliance with carbon emissions trading systems. 
Therefore, the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board should implement standards for the 
presentation of allowances on companies’ financial statements. 
Introduction 
 Cap-and-trade programs, proposed as a means to regulate air qual-
ity,1 reduce emissions by limiting the total amount of pollution that can 
be emitted in a given area at a given time.2 The government issues enti-
tlements for a certain quantity of pollution, which companies can then 
trade as needed.3 To be successful, cap-and-trade programs must work 
efficiently over the long-term with industry and business,4 and will only 
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2011–12. 
1 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7651(a)–(b) (2006) (discussing Congress’s intent to reduce sul-
fur dioxide emissions in the atmosphere through a system of emission allocations and 
transfers); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (describ-
ing the signatories’ commitment to reducing greenhouse gases through market based 
mechanisms); Bonnie G. Colby, Cap-and-Trade Policy Challenges: A Tale of Three Markets, 76 
Land Econ. 638, 638–40 (2000). 
2 See Cong. Budget Office, Managing Allowance Prices in a Cap-and-Trade 
Program, at vii (2010). 
3 See id. 
4 See, e.g., Joseph M. Ragan & A. J. Stagliano, Cap and Trade Allowance Accounting: A Di-
vergence Between Theory and Practice, 5 J. Bus. & Econ. Res. 47, 48–49 (2007). 
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be effective if they change the way businesses account for their impacts 
on the environment.5 To date, major accounting standards-setting bod-
ies have not passed concrete guidance on cap-and-trade accounting, 
giving businesses the ability to only seemingly comply with emissions 
trading laws by manipulating their financial statements.6 
 In response to this lack of uniform reporting across financial state-
ments, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the In-
ternational Accounting Standards Board (IASB) placed accounting for 
cap-and-trade programs on their regulatory agendas.7 After a series of 
preliminary hearings, the two bodies delayed further decision making 
until opportunities for public comment conclude in the second quarter 
of 2012.8 Despite this delay, uniform guidance from these authorities is 
necessary.9  
 With the rise in awareness of global warming and increased sensi-
tivity to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,10 accounting for 
carbon cap-and-trade programs is an increasingly relevant issue.11 Al-
though GHG emissions trading is neither required nor facilitated by 
federal law in the United States, a future transition to this system is pos-
sible.12 In addition, U.S. companies operating abroad may be required 
to follow foreign cap-and-trade regulations of GHGs.13 Since limitations 
on GHG emissions will potentially impact many U.S. companies, this 
Note focuses on accounting for cap-and-trade with specific regard to 
carbon emissions.14 This Note draws on U.S. accounting standards and 
                                                                                                                      
5 See, e.g., Bradford T. Bartels, Wall Street Walk Dead End for Chesapeake Cleanup?, 35 Wm. 
& Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 303, 333 (2010). 
6 See Denise Lugo, Emissions Trading: Boards Weigh Emissions Trading Liabilities for Alloca-
tions in Cap-and-Trade Schemes, 41 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 2066 (Sept. 17, 2010). 
7 See FASB Technical Plan and Project Updates, Fin. Acct. Standards Bd., http://www. 
fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site=FASB&c=FASBContent_C&pagename=FASB%2FFASB 
Content_C%2FProjectUpdatePage&cid=900000011097 (last updated Dec. 6, 2010) [here-
inafter Project Updates]. 
8 See Emissions Trading Schemes (Paused), IFRS Found., http://www.ifrs.org/Current+Pro-
jects/IASB+Projects/Emission+Trading+Schemes/Emissions+Trading+Schemes.htm (last 
updated June 29, 2011). 
9 See David A. Detomasi, International Regimes: The Case of Western Corporate Governance, 8 
Int’l Stud. Rev. 225, 240–241 (2006). 
10 See Cong. Budget Office, supra note 2, at 1. 
11 See Ernst & Young, Carbon Market Readiness: Accounting, Compliance, Re-
porting and Tax Considerations Under State and National Carbon Emissions 
Programs 2, 4 (2010), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Carbon_ 
market_readiness/$FILE/0912-1118264%20Carbon%20market%20Readiness.pdf. 
12 See Cong. Budget Office, supra note 2, at 1. 
13 See Scott D. Deatherage, The SEC Enters the Fray on Climate Risk Disclosure, 25 Nat. Re-
sources & Env’t 35, 35 (2011). 
14 See infra notes 21–113, 160–265 and accompanying text. 
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considers international implications of current foreign legislation as 
well as current and potential U.S. regulations.15  
 This Note presents a solution to the issue of ambiguity in account-
ing practices for cap-and-trade.16 Part I addresses the structure of cap-
and-trade programs, and discusses emissions trading in the United 
States and abroad.17 Part II describes the structure of financial state-
ments and addresses the FASB and the IASB rulemaking process.18 Part 
III describes current guidance from the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) on GHG accounting and discusses voluntary reporting 
programs.19 Part IV presents a solution for the lack of uniformity in 
allowance accounting, and discusses the benefits of such a solution.20  
                                                                                                                     
I. Cap-and-Trade Programs as Solutions for  
Environmental Problems 
 In the past decade, the world has grown more interested in cap-
and-trade initiatives.21 Cap-and-trade programs control and limit levels 
of pollution emitted into the environment,22 thus encouraging busi-
nesses to change their operations to reduce pollution.23 Cap-and-trade 
legislation holds businesses more accountable for their negative im-
pacts on the environment.24  
 Both shareholder calls for environmental reform and cap-and-
trade regulations force corporations to internalize the costs of pollu-
tion.25 Shareholders apply pressure to business leaders of publically 
 
15 See infra notes 52–178, 192–265 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 192–265 and accompanying text.  
17 See infra notes 21–113 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 114–159 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 160–191 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 192–265 and accompanying text. 
21 See Donald N. Dewees, Emissions Trading: ERCs or Allowances?, 77 Land Econ. 513, 
513 (2001). Cap-and-trade schemes are one of several different types of programs that can 
fall under the rubric of emissions trading, including baseline and credit systems, project-
based certificates, and renewable energy certificates. See Project Updates, supra note 7. Al-
though all such schemes are considered by the FASB, this Note will focus solely on cap-
and-trade allowances. See id. 
22 See Ass’n of Wash. Cities, Cap and Trade—A Primer 1–2 (2008), available at 
http://www.awcnet.org/documents/CapTradePrimer.pdf. 
23 See Dewees, supra note 21, at 525 (discussing how emissions limitations may motivate 
businesses to reduce levels of pollutant-producing activities). 
24 See Janet Peace & Robert N. Stavins, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, 
Meaningful and Cost Effective Climate Policy: The Case for Cap and Trade 1–2 
(2010). 
25 See Bartels, supra note 5, at 304. 
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held companies to take environmental reform measures.26 Additionally, 
given courts’ increased consideration of environmental harms, corpo-
rate managers may increase their responsiveness to shareholder envi-
ronmental concerns.27 Thus, due to the possibility of federal cap-and-
trade legislation and shareholder influence,28 corporations may be on 
the cusp of major environmental reform.  
A. The Structure of Cap-and-Trade 
 Cap-and-trade programs center on government distributions of 
emissions authorizations to regulated entities,29 and cap total emissions 
across all entities within a given area.30 Generally, the government then 
distributes a set level of emissions authorizations to regulated entities.31 
These allowances are authorizations to emit fixed quantities of pollu-
tion.32 Companies may trade allowances, thus ultimately performing a 
cost-benefit analysis of emitting additional pollution.33 The govern-
ment may issue emissions allowances for many different types of pollu-
tion.34 Governments have notably used the allowance system to curb 
carbon emissions and reduce acid rain.35 Although there are different 
designs of cap-and-trade systems,36 this Note focuses on the allowance 
methodology.  
                                                                                                                      
26 See id. at 332. 
27 See id. at 333. 
28 Cong. Budget Office, supra note 2, at 1 (describing the possibility of federal car-
bon cap-and-trade legislation in the United States and discussing shareholder proposals as 
“important supplement[s]” to environmental legislation). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See Ass’n of Wash. Cities, supra note 22, at 3. 
33 See id. at 2 (describing a company’s process for determining the number of allow-
ances it needs); see also Cong. Budget Office, supra note 2, at 2 (describing an allowance 
trading market). 
34 Colby, supra note 1, at 638 (describing the use of market mechanisms to control 
“lead in gasoline, ozone depleting chemicals, nitrogen oxide and sulfur emissions, new 
vehicle fuel efficiency, urban land development, and retirement of older, heavily polluting 
vehicles”). 
35 See Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), Eur. Comm’n, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/ 
policies/ets/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 15, 2010) [hereinafter EU ETS]; SO2 Reduc-
tions and Allowance Trading Under the Acid Rain Program, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www. 
epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/arp/s02.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2009) [hereinafter SO2 
Reductions]. 
36 See Dewees, supra note 21, at 513 (noting differences between systems based on emis-
sion reduction credits and allowances, as well as open and closed trading markets). 
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 In an allowance trading system, a government regulator distributes 
allowances according to the design of the particular cap-and-trade pro-
gram.37 The regulator may sell allowances directly to companies 
through an auction, or may initially allocate allowances to companies at 
no cost.38 Companies use their allowances when they emit pollution.39 
Under some cap-and-trade program designs, if a company has unused 
allowances during the regulatory period, it may carry them over to fu-
ture years40—a practice referred to as banking. In addition to banking 
allowances, regulated entities can also trade unneeded allowances.41 
Following each regulatory period, the regulator determines whether 
the polluter has an allowance to satisfy all units of pollution emitted.42 
If the entity has released too much pollution, the regulator may impose 
fines.43  
 Importantly, emissions trading markets may impact the industrial 
sector on the whole, as companies can profit from the sale of unused 
credits.44 The initial allocation of allowances by governments to com-
panies, followed by secondary trading in the market, impacts the prices 
of goods and services to consumers.45 For example, companies not im-
pacted directly by allowances may see competitors’ prices altered by 
expenses or profits resulting from allowance trading.46 Thus, properly 
accounting for allowances affects a company’s ability to remain com-
petitive in its primary market.47  
 Cap-and-trade programs for GHG emissions impact many different 
industries. Within each industry the effects of cap-and-trade on busi-
ness are not limited to profits and losses from the sale and purchase of 
allowances, but may also have consequences for large-scale business 
                                                                                                                      
37 See Ass’n of Wash. Cities, supra note 22, at 2. 
38 Id. 
39 See Cong. Budget Office, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
40 See, e.g., id. at 2. 
41 See Richard Sandor et al., Greenhouse-Gas-Trading Markets, 360 Phil. Transactions: 
Mathematical, Physical & Engineering Sci. 1889, 1890 (2002). 
42 See, e.g., Cong. Budget Office, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
43 See, e.g., Acid Rain Program: Notice of Annual Adjustment Factors for Excess Emis-
sion Penalty, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,334, 52,334 (Oct. 7, 1997) (discussing penalties for noncom-
pliance under the U.S. Acid Rain Program); see also Colby, supra note 1, at 649 tbl.1. 
44 See Ass’n of Wash. Cities, supra note 22, at 2. See generally Colby, supra note 1 (dis-
cussing the wide-ranging impacts that environmental market mechanisms can have on 
industry). 
45 Ass’n of Wash. Cities, supra note 22, at 2. 
46 Id. For instance, under the Acid Rain Program, only larger coal-burning electric util-
ities in certain locations were initially regulated, leaving smaller non-coal burning plants 
exempt from complying with the allowance system. See SO2 Reductions, supra note 35. 
47 See Ass’n of Wash. Cities, supra note 22, at 2; Ernst & Young, supra note 11, at 5. 
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decisions.48 Directly affecting business decision making as it relates to 
the environment is an important aspect of cap-and-trade.49 For exam-
ple, businesses may increase capital expenditures on technology to re-
duce emissions, thereby requiring fewer allowances.50 By changing the 
way companies operate in the long-term, emissions trading programs 
seek a steady reduction in carbon in a cost-conscious and effective man-
ner.51  
B. Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade in the United States 
1. A Recent History of Federal Cap-and-Trade Programs in the United 
States 
 In the last decade, cap-and-trade programs have risen to the fore-
front of U.S. politics.52 Many debate the possibility of using cap-and-
trade to combat global warming.53 Global warming occurs when 
GHGs—most notably carbon dioxide—remain in the atmosphere trap-
ping sunlight, which causes the Earth’s temperature to increase.54 In 
recent years, Congress has considered legislation that would establish a 
trading system to limit U.S. carbon emissions.55 Although Congress has 
not passed such legislation, these proposals and other state laws ensure 
that carbon cap-and-trade will continue to be an issue for American 
companies.56  
                                                                                                                      
48 See, e.g., Andrew G. Keeler, Nat’l Reg. Res. Inst., State Commission Electricity 
Regulation Under a Federal Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Policy 23 (2008) (dis-
cussing the impact of an allowance system on a utility company’s decision to buy or build); 
Trucost, Carbon Risks and Opportunities in the S&P 500, at 17 chart 5 (2009), available 
at http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/irrc_trucost_0906.pdf. 
49 See World Res. Inst., The Bottom Line on Cap-and-Trade 1 (2008), available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/bottom_line_cap_and_trade.pdf. 
50 See id. at 24 (indicating that a company may purchase allowances rather than invest 
in greener technology). 
51 See Ctr. for Am. Progress, Cap-and-Trade 101, at 1 (2008), available at http://www. 
americanprogress.org/issues/2008/01/pdf/capandtrade101.pdf. 
52 See Dewees, supra note 21, at 513. 
53 See World Res. Inst., supra note 49, at 1. 
54 See Global Warming Definition, Globalwarmingdefinition.org, http://globalwarming 
definition.org/ (last visited May 9, 2012). 
55 See Kenneth R. Richards & Stephanie Hayes Richards, U.S. Senate Climate Change Bills 
in the 110th Congress: Learning by Doing, 33 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 1, 3 (2009). 
56 See Juliet Howland, Not All Carbon Credits Are Created Equal: The Constitution and the 
Cost of Regional Cap-and-Trade Market Linkage, 27 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 413, 414 
(2009). 
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 The proposed cap-and-trade bills are useful for predicting the 
structure of a future U.S. carbon emissions trading system.57 The 
House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Secu-
rity Act of 2009 (also known as the Waxman-Markey Bill),58 marking 
the first time a house of Congress supported a firm carbon emissions 
limitation.59 The bill proposed a cap-and-trade system that reduced 
GHG emissions to 83% of 2005 levels by the year 2050.60 The bill rec-
ognized market effects of cap-and-trade legislation by giving companies 
in the energy sector free allowances to maintain a lower cost of en-
ergy.61 To preserve the ability to compete worldwide, the bill also called 
for government rebates to companies that interact frequently in the 
global market.62 The bill would have created distributions to other 
companies through the use of government grants or auctions, proceeds 
of which would be used to fund industry-specific subsidies.63 Despite its 
merits, the Senate did not pass the proposed legislation.64 
                                                                                                                     
 Prior to the Waxman-Markey Bill, the Lieberman-Warner Climate 
Security Act of 2007 proposed a cap-and-trade system that also relied on 
the use of allowances.65 The Lieberman-Warner Bill would have re-
duced GHG emissions to 42% of 2000 levels by the year 2050.66 This 
bill rewarded companies that previously reduced emissions by granting 
substantial amounts of free allowances.67 Industry supported this pro-
posed legislation because companies would receive rather than pur-
chase allowances from the government.68 Nevertheless, neither the 
House nor Senate voted on the bill due to a lack of popular support.69 
 
57 See Richards & Richards, supra note 55, at 3–4. 
58 Patrick Tutwiler, Climate Change Legislation: Where Does It Stand?, GovTrackInsider.com 
(Apr. 27, 2010), http://theperpetualview.wordpress.com/2011/04/15/climate-change-
legislation-where-does-it-stand/. 
59 See Nadine Etienne, Note, Should We Go Green for the Waxman-Markey Bill?, 21 Ford-
ham Envtl. L. Rev. 345, 347 (2010). 
60 Id. at 362–63. 
61 Id. at 363. 
62 Id. 
63 See Tutwiler, supra note 58. 
64 Waxman-Markey Climate Change Bill, GovTrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bill.xpd?bill=h111-2454 (last visited May 9, 2012). A major concern was that the plan would 
disadvantage U.S. companies in competition with businesses from developing countries that 
do not have climate change legislation. See Etienne, supra note 59, at 365. 
65 S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 1201 (2007). 
66 See Richards & Richards, supra note 55, at 11. 
67 See id. at 37. 
68 See Tutwiler, supra note 58. 
69 See Lieberman-Warner Climate Change Bill, GovTrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-2191 (last visited May 9, 2012). 
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 Although the federal government has not imposed a cap-and-trade 
system for carbon emissions, however, it has implemented a cap-and-
trade system for acid rain.70 Created under Title IV of the 1990 Clean 
Air Act Amendments, the acid rain cap-and-trade program targets sul-
fur dioxide, one of the primary causes of acid rain.71 In this system, the 
EPA allocates allowances to companies, which can then freely trade the 
allowances with other businesses.72 The Acid Rain Program uses allow-
ances as the primary regulatory methodology, and the EPA implements 
the program in two phases.73 During the first phase, the EPA distributes 
allowances to companies—information about the distributions is pub-
licly available.74 In phase two, the EPA adopts a broader approach, ex-
panding the group of sources required to use allowances and placing a 
hard cap on total annual sulfur dioxide emissions.75 Thus, acid rain 
cap-and-trade is a system whose regulatory impacts increase over time.  
2. State Regulation of Greenhouse Gases 
 In lieu of federal action, state and local governments developed 
laws and regulations regarding GHG emissions—California is the pri-
mary example.76 In addition to creating a statewide cap on emissions, 
the California legislature passed the Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006 requiring the California Air Resources Board to pass regulations 
that mandate the reporting of total emissions from individual sources 
within the state.77 Following California’s lead, several other states re-
                                                                                                                      
70 See Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based Envi-
ronmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J. L. & Econ. 37, 38 (1998). 
71 Id. 
72 See SO2 Reductions, supra note 35. 
73 Id. 
Allowances are the currency with which compliance with the SO2 emissions 
requirements is achieved. Through the market-based allowance trading sys-
tem, utilities regulated under the Acid Rain Program decide the most cost-
effective way to use available resources to comply with the requirements of 
the Clean Air Act. Utilities can reduce emissions by employing energy conser-
vation measures, increasing reliance on renewable energy, reducing usage, 
employing pollution control technologies, switching to lower sulfur fuel, or 
developing other alternate strategies. 
Id. 
74 See Acid Rain Program SO2 Allowance Fact Sheet, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www. 
epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/factsheet.html#how (last updated Apr. 14, 2009). 
75 See id. 
76 See Neil Keenan, Note, Global Warming Due to Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Success of 
State Solutions as a Model for a Federal Solution, 34 J. Legis. 168, 168, 174–76 (2008). 
77 See id. at 174–75. 
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cently created programs to curb GHG emissions.78 Although imple-
mentation of these programs proved difficult, they serve as reminders 
that more serious federal regulations on global warming should be 
considered.79 
 Various state lawmakers created the Regional Greenhouse Gas Ini-
tiative (RGGI) in 2005 in an effort to curb climate change.80 As a result 
of RGGI, ten states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic participated in a 
regional carbon cap-and-trade program.81 Targeted at companies in 
the energy industry, the program caps carbon emissions at a declining 
rate.82 Although states have historically refused to collectively address 
environmental concerns, regional climate change initiatives such as 
RGGI show that increased cooperation between states is possible.83 
 The Western Climate Initiative is another regional program that 
focuses on preventing climate change.84 The initiative is a coalition of 
seven U.S. states and four Canadian provinces committed to reducing 
GHG emissions.85 During the signing of the Initiative, Governor Janet 
Napolitano of Arizona remarked that “[i]n the absence of meaningful 
federal action, it is up to the states to take action to address climate 
change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in this country.”86 Thus, 
many regional and state programs are perhaps only temporary solu-
tions to the problem, and should be replaced by more permanent fed-
eral regulations.87 
                                                                                                                      
78 See id. at 173–74. 
79 See id. at 168, 174. 
80 See Lesley K. McAllister, Regional Climate Regulation: From State Competition to State Col-
laboration, 1 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 81, 89 (2009). 
81 Program Design, Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/design 
(last visited May 9, 2012). 
82 See id. (stating that “these states have capped and will reduce power sector CO2 emis-
sions 10 percent by 2018”). 
83 See McAllister, supra note 80, at 92–93 (identifying and discussing “three reasons for 
the high degree of state collaboration: to facilitate policy diffusion, to achieve efficiencies 
in cap-and-trade, and to engage in a regional race to national influence”). 
84 See Steve Owens, Climate Change Action in Arizona, 27 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 317, 
329 (2009). 
85 See W. Climate Initiative, Clean Energy: Creating Jobs, Protecting the Envi-
ronment 1 (2010), available at http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/document-archives/ 
general/WCI-Brochure-(May-2010)/. 
86 See Owens, supra note 84, at 330; Press Release, Ariz. Governor’s Commc’n Office, Five 
Western Governors Announce Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Agreement (Feb. 26, 
2007), available at http://www.governor.wa.gov/news/2007-02-26_WesternClimateAgreement 
Release.pdf. 
87 See Howland, supra note 56, at 414. 
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 The Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGRA) is an-
other regional program aimed at reducing GHG emissions.88 Notable 
to MGGRA’s design is the program’s creation of and reliance upon the 
Greenhouse Gas Advisory Group—a coalition of public, corporate, and 
non-profit representatives that makes recommendations to state legisla-
tors.89 Despite the benefits of regional cap-and-trade programs, some 
debate the value of individual states’ participation.90 The struggles ex-
perienced with implementing regional cap-and-trade programs high-
light the need for federal climate change intervention.91 
C. Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Abroad 
1. The European Union’s Emissions Trading System 
 Although the United States does not currently require participa-
tion in a carbon cap-and-trade program, emissions trading abroad still 
impacts U.S. businesses.92 In 2005, the European Union (EU) imposed 
a cap-and-trade system named the Emissions Trading System (ETS).93 
Implemented in thirty countries, the system regulates carbon dioxide 
and nitrous oxide emissions.94 The program caps the total amount of 
the emissions, and program administrators then issue allowances to 
companies that can buy and sell them on the open market.95 By limit-
ing the total number of allowances available, the regulators ensure that 
each allowance has a value.96 As allowances are traded on the emissions 
market, their values may fluctuate according to bid and offer prices.97 
Further, the ETS program reduces the number of allowances available 
                                                                                                                      
88 Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/mggra (last visited May 14, 
2012). 
89 See Keenan, supra note 76, at 171. 
90 See, e.g., Russ Harding, Time to Abandon Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, 
Mackinac Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y (May 6, 2010), http://www.mackinac.org/12692 (arguing 
that Michigan should withdraw from MGGRA because participation in the program harms 
the state’s economy). 
91 See McAllister, supra note 80, at 82. 
92 See Deatherage, supra note 13, at 35. 
93 See EU ETS, supra note 35. 
94 Id. 
95 See id. 
96 See COGEN Europe, A CHP Guide to the Revised EU ETS Directive 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.cogeneurope.eu/wp-content/uploads//2011/03/290311-COGEN-
Europe-A_CHP_Guide_to_EUETS.pdf. 
97 See Jonathan Hill et al., The Emissions Trading Market: Risks and Chal-
lenges 15 (2008). 
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yearly, with a goal of reducing emissions in 2020 to 79% of 2005 lev-
els.98  
 Some commentators claim that the program is a “complete fail-
ure.”99 They argue that the cap-and-trade system has not resulted in 
increased investment in green technology, but has shifted attention 
away from more effective methods of decreasing carbon emissions.100 
Complying with the ETS, however, remains an important consideration 
for U.S. companies doing business abroad,101 and any future U.S. emis-
sions trading regulatory regime should contemplate the European ex-
perience.102 
                                                                                                                     
2. The Kyoto Protocol 
 Although not law in the United States,103 the Kyoto Protocol repre-
sents a significant attempt at reducing global emissions of GHGs.104 
The Protocol sets emissions targets for thirty-seven countries to reduce 
GHGs to 1990 levels.105 The Protocol allows countries to meet their in-
dividual targets through a variety of primary market-based mecha-
nisms.106 Article 17 of the Protocol creates markets for emissions trad-
ing.107 In addition to carbon permits, other regulated substances within 
the program can be traded as well.108 Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol 
 
98 See EU ETS, supra note 35. 
99 Sarah-Jayne Clifton, Friends of the Earth, A Dangerous Obsession: The Evi-
dence Against Carbon Trading and for Real Solutions to Avoid a Climate Crunch 
20 (2009), available at http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/dangerous_obsession.pdf 
(arguing that the ETS has failed in the industrial sector). 
100 See id. at 5. 
101 See Deatherage, supra note 13, at 35. 
102 See Richards & Richards, supra note 55, at 22. 
103 John M. Broder, Climate Talks in Durban Yield Limited Agreement, N.Y. Times (Dec. 11, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/science/earth/countries-at-un-conference-
agree-to-draft-new-emissions-treaty.html. 
104 See Kyoto Protocol, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, http:// 
unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited May 9, 2012). 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 See Emissions Trading, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, http:// 
unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php (last visited 
May 9, 2012). 
108 See id. Other instruments that may be traded under the Kyoto Protocol include re-
moval units based on land use, land use change and forestry activities like reforestation, 
emission reduction units from joint implementation projects, and certified emission re-
duction from clean development mechanism project activity. Id. 
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sets out registry systems to track all sales of traded emissions units.109 
The registry ensures that traded emissions units can be tracked to the 
current owner of the units.110  
 Like the global experience, the U.S. debate over the implementa-
tion of a carbon cap-and-trade program highlights different views on 
how to make carbon cap-and-trade programs effective.111 A successful 
program must involve a scheme that is workable for businesses and in-
centivizes true compliance with pollution-reduction goals.112 Account-
ing regulations are one way to influence businesses operations.113  
II. How Accounting Interacts with Cap-and-Trade 
A. Accurate Accounting Is Necessary to Provide Markets with a True 
Understanding of Financial Position 
 Financial statements are the primary means by which outsiders 
evaluate a company.114 A company’s financial statements impact how 
others will value the company, which can ultimately affect the price of 
stock, the ability of the company to receive loans, or its ability to engage 
in a variety of business transactions.115 With respect to allowances, two 
financial documents of interest are the balance sheet and income 
statement.116 The balance sheet values assets, liabilities, and equity, 
while the income statement presents revenues and expenses.117 The 
information presented in financial statements should accurately depict 
a company’s financial position in part because stakeholders rely on the-
se documents to make value determinations.118 
                                                                                                                      
109 See Registry Systems Under the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/registry_systems/items/2723.php 
(last visited May 9, 2012). 
110 Id. 
111 See Keenan, supra note 76, at 171. 
112 Cf. McAllister, supra note 80, at 95 (discussing the effect of state climate policy on 
in-state businesses). 
113 See, e.g., Ranjani Krishnan, The Effect of Changes in Regulation and Competition on Firms’ 
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114 See Thomas R. Dyckman et al., Intermediate Accounting 5 (3d ed. 1995). An-
nual financial statements include the balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash 
flows, and statement of retained earnings. Id. at 5–6. 
115 See Clyde P. Stickney & Roman L. Weil, Financial Accounting: An Introduc-
tion to Concepts, Methods, and Uses 19 (9th ed. 2000). 
116 See Ernst & Young, supra note 11, at 6 (discussing the possibility of accounting for 
cap-and-trade impacting obligations on the balance sheet and also affecting gains on the 
income statement). 
117 Stickney & Weil, supra note 115, at 11. 
118 See Dyckman et al., supra note 114, at 5. 
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 The balance sheet displays the assets, liabilities, and equity of a 
company.119 Assets are “economic resources with the ability or potential 
to provide future benefits to a firm.”120 Liabilities represent a com-
pany’s future obligations, and equity is the owners’ investment in the 
firm.121 Revenues and expenses impact retained earnings, which is part 
of equity.122 As a general rule, the sum of liabilities and equity must 
equal assets—for every increase or decrease to assets, there must be a 
corresponding increase or decrease to liabilities or equity.123 Individual 
assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses are listed in separate accounts 
on the balance sheet.124 
 Cap-and-trade programs could also affect the income statement.125 
The income statement lists revenues and expenses, and the difference 
between the two is recorded as net income.126 Since revenues increase 
net income, and expenses decrease net income, company managers 
generally seek to maximize revenue while minimizing expenses.127  
 The income statement must accurately reflect business transac-
tions for the period in which they occur.128 When a company’s business 
operations incur an expense, the company should record the expense 
on both the balance sheet and the income statement, regardless of 
whether there was a cash expenditure during the period.129 This meth-
od of accounting is known as an accrual, and requires both a debit to 
“Accrued Expenses” and a credit to “Expenses Payable” in the equity 
and liability sections of the balance sheet, respectively.130 
                                                                                                                      
119 Stickney & Weil, supra note 115, at 9. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 9–10. 
122 See id. at 10–11. 
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at 75. 
124 Id. at 64–67. 
125 See Ernst & Young, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that cap-and-trade could impact 
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126 Stickney & Weil, supra note 115, at 11. 
127 See id. at 12. 
128 See Dyckman et al., supra note 114, at 35. 
129 See id. at 41. GAAP requires accrual basis accounting. See Chapter 3: Income Measure-
ment, Principlesofaccounting.com, http://www.principlesofaccounting.com/chapter3/ 
chapter3.html (last visited May 14, 2012).  
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 The income statement may also impact management’s incentives 
when executives are paid using incentive-based compensation.131 Un-
der this compensation structure, when the company is performing well 
in the stock market, managers’ compensation will be higher than when 
the company is performing poorly.132 Incentive-based compensation 
structures can therefore provide managers with a direct personal incen-
tive to increase profitability.133  
 Financial statements include both quantitative disclosures, such as 
the income statement and the balance sheet,134 and qualitative disclo-
sures, such as written discussions of financial performance in the finan-
cial statement footnotes.135 Various methods may be used to measure 
the value of assets, liabilities, equity, revenues, and expenses in these 
documents.136 For example, an asset may be valued at its purchase 
price or at fair market value.137 When the value of an asset is measured 
at fair market value, companies must make year-end adjustments to in-
crease or decrease the value of the asset based on fluctuations in the 
market price.138 To increase the value of an asset, an asset account is 
debited and an equity account— “Unrealized Gain on Asset” —
credited.139 Unrealized gain and loss accounts are listed in a special sec-
tion of the income statement called “Other Comprehensive Income,” 
and do not impact net income.140 Gains and losses do not impact net 
income until they are realized141—meaning that the asset has actually 
been sold and the company has received cash.142 When a company sells 
                                                                                                                      
131 See Sudarshan Jayaraman & Todd Milbourn, Financial Misreporting and Executive 
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140 Stickney & Weil, supra note 115, at 674–75. 
141 See id. at 674. 
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visited May 15, 2012). 
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an asset, “Unrealized Income” is debited and “Realized Gain” or “Real-
ized Loss” is credited,143 thereby impacting net income.144  
                                                                                                                     
 To illustrate the need for uniformity in accounting methods,145 
consider two identical companies that have excess allowances to sell. If 
the first company recognizes the allowances as assets while the second 
company merely mentions the extra allowances in the footnotes to its 
financial statements, the first company may appear financially stronger 
when compared to the second.146 This discrepancy would result in inef-
ficient valuation by the market. Uniformity in accounting standards 
could prevent such an outcome.147 
B. Uniform Accounting Standards Are Promulgated by the FASB and the IASB 
 To prevent misleading financial statements, all publicly-traded U.S. 
companies must follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP), a set of rules promulgated with help from the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB)148 under the regulatory authority of 
the SEC.149 Due to the need for a common global conceptual account-
ing framework, efforts to align GAAP with the international accounting 
standards known as International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) have increased in recent years.150 The International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) promulgates IFRS, which companies through-
out the world follow.151 
 Neither IFRS nor GAAP provides clear guidance on accounting for 
cap-and-trade allowances.152 As a result, companies disclose greenhouse 
 
143 See id. 
144 See Stickney & Weil, supra note 115, at 674–75. 
145 See id. at 20 (discussing the need for uniformity in selecting accounting methods 
across firms). 
146 See id. at 9 (stating that assets have the potential to provide benefits to a firm). The 
dollar value of assets held by the first company will be higher than the assets of the second. 
Id. Thus, even though both companies are identical, one will be deemed to be in a strong-
er financial position than the other. Id. 
147 See id. at 20 (discussing the benefits of uniformity in accounting methods). 
148 See FASB Accounting Standards Updates, Fin. Acct. Standards Bd., http://www. 
fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176156316498 (last visited May 15, 2012). 
149 See Facts About FASB, Fin. Acct. Standards Bd., http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/ 
Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495 (last visited May 15, 2012). 
150 See Convergence with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), Fin. Acct. 
Standards Bd., http://www.fasb.org/intl/convergence_iasb.shtml (last visited May 9, 2012). 
151 See Int’l Accounting Standards Bd., Who We Are and What We Do 4, 5 (2011), 
available at http://www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/F9EC8205-E883-4A53-9972-AD95BD28E0B5/ 
0/WhoWeAreEnglishMay2011.pdf. 
152 See Lugo, supra note 6. 
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gas emissions in varying manners,153 highlighting the need for an ac-
counting framework companies can apply consistently.154 Even when 
commentators agree that allowances should be presented in financial 
statements, determining how to measure allowances still remains open 
to debate.155 Not only do companies vary in whether they display allow-
ances quantitatively or qualitatively, but they also differ in their meth-
ods for listing and quantifying disclosures.156 In a study of 125 financial 
statements filed between 2000 and 2004, 61 companies (or 49%) did 
not disclose allowances at all, while 47 (or 37%) qualitatively disclosed 
allowances, and only 17 (or 14%) had some form of quantitative disclo-
sure.157 
 Because methods of accounting for allowances are diverse both 
internationally and in the United States, the IASB and the FASB recog-
nize the need to set concrete regulations for allowance accounting.158 
The FASB and the IASB are currently in the process of developing the-
se standards.159 
III. Authoritative and Voluntary Regulations for  
Allowances Accounting 
A. Current Authoritative Regulations on Accounting for  
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 During debate over accounting for allowances at the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB),160 the SEC issued an interpretive 
release titled Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate 
Change in response to increased public discussion of the topic.161 The 
release clarifies the SEC’s views on proper accounting for climate 
change under existing law,162 and provides qualitative guidance, sug-
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gesting reporting locations, descriptions, and methods for describing 
assessments of risks.163 
 In its release, the SEC suggests that companies include environ-
mental considerations in the description of their business.164 For ex-
ample, companies should note the costs of compliance with environ-
mental laws, and report costs related to capital expenditures required 
to bring them into compliance with regulations.165 In addition, the SEC 
encourages companies to describe legal proceedings related to non-
compliance with environmental laws, unless the proceedings are con-
sidered “ordinary routine litigation incidental to . . . business.”166 
 Further, the SEC discusses the relevance of the “Management Dis-
cussion and Analysis” section of financial statements, stating that com-
panies should disclose known trends likely to have a material impact on 
financial position.167 In this section, management must disclose infor-
mation about the quality and variability of the company’s earnings so 
external users can evaluate the degree to which current financial 
statements predict future financial position.168 Management may need 
to reveal potential impacts of a cap-and-trade system on future financial 
position.169 
 In its release, the SEC also notes that financial statements should 
present potential risks related to climate change.170 In the footnotes to 
the financial statements, a section titled “Risk Factors” should discuss 
significant issues that could put the company’s financial position at 
                                                                                                                      
163 See id. at 6293–94 (noting a list of non-quantitative disclosures). 
164 See id. at 6293. 
165 See id. 
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the issue is considered material to financial position. See id. In evaluating the materiality of 
a future environmental concern, management must first consider whether the event is 
reasonably likely to occur. See id. at 6295. Second, if management cannot come to a conclu-
sion about the likelihood of occurrence, it must consider the consequences of the event 
assuming that it will occur and whether or not those consequences will be material to the 
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risk.171 The risk of a potential impact of future environmental legisla-
tion or regulation on the company’s financial position should be dis-
closed if it is reasonably likely to be enacted, or assuming it is enacted, 
is reasonably likely to materially affect the company’s financial posi-
tion.172 Possible consequences of cap-and-trade regulation include ex-
penses or profits related to sales of allowances,173 costs to improve fa-
cilities for compliance with emissions limitations,174 and changes in 
demand resulting from alterations in prices for goods and services.175 
The SEC even suggests that the physical effects of climate change, if 
particularly significant to a business, should be noted in the financial 
statements.176 These physical effects include “the severity of weather . . . 
sea levels, the arability of farmland, and water availability and qual-
ity.”177 The SEC’s interpretive release serves as valuable guidance on 
federal securities laws and regulations to the business community.178 
B. Voluntary Reporting Regimes 
 In addition to authoritative guidance, companies may also look for 
accounting guidance from independent bodies that support voluntary 
environmental reporting standards.179 Optional compliance may be in 
the best interests of a company that wishes to avoid a reputation for 
causing environmental harm.180 One such program is The Climate 
Registry, which implements standards in North America “to calculate, 
verify and publicly report . . . [businesses’] carbon footprints in a single, 
unified registry.”181 The Registry’s goal is to provide transparency to the 
public regarding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.182 Public reports 
on each participating company include information about direct and 
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indirect emissions, geographic area impacted, and presentation of 
emissions over multiple years.183 
 A similar institution, the Carbon Disclosure Project, works with 
more than 650 institutional investors to gather GHG emissions data.184 
The Project seeks to curb global warming by making information about 
emissions available to large investors, potentially impacting investment 
decisions.185 Reporting to the Project can help companies gain a repu-
tation as leaders in GHG emissions reductions.186 
 A third voluntary regulatory body, the Global Reporting Initiative, 
publishes sustainability reports on participating companies.187 The Ini-
tiative establishes metrics by which participating entities can compare 
and measure their “economic, environmental, social, and governance 
performance.”188 It focuses on reporting information relating to envi-
ronmental practices of companies throughout the world.189 Voluntary 
reporting regimes can be an important source of public information 
on environmental compliance.190 True transparency, however, only 
comes with nondiscretionary disclosures.191 
IV. Accounting for Allowances: An Analysis 
 Although the United States does not have a federal climate change 
program,192 recent proposals for regulations that would limit green-
house gas (GHG) emissions show that such federal legislation may be 
forthcoming.193 One can make predictions about the potential features 
of a future federal carbon cap-and-trade program based on analogous 
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state and regional programs.194 Potential cap-and-trade systems are like-
ly to revolve around both allowance requirements for emissions and an 
emissions trading market with ready buyers.195  
 Despite the lack of a federal emissions trading system, foreign cap-
and-trade regulations will continue to apply to U.S. companies operat-
ing abroad.196 The European Union Emissions Trading System demon-
strates that such programs can be implemented successfully on a large 
scale,197 while the Kyoto Protocol highlights a global trend towards us-
ing permits and other market mechanisms to regulate pollution.198 
Even if Congress does not pass GHG cap-and-trade legislation, account-
ing for allowances within an emissions trading framework will still be a 
relevant issue for U.S. companies facing existing foreign and state cap-
and-trade regulations.199 
 The underlying policy goals of cap-and-trade legislation are to con-
trol pollution200 and incentivize businesses to implement greener, more 
environmentally friendly methods of operation.201 Generally, the gov-
ernment reduces emissions limits over time until emission targets are 
met.202 When the government reaches its target, it has achieved its ul-
timate goal of creating a more sustainable environment.203 The current 
system of accounting for allowances does not facilitate accomplishment 
of this goal.204  
 Currently, no system exists for accounting for, and reporting on, 
cap-and-trade programs.205 Additionally, there are no comprehensive 
regulations imposing uniform accounting standards for cap-and-trade 
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related issues.206 Accordingly, businesses use a variety of accounting 
methods and reporting techniques.207 When companies do not use the 
same accounting methods, businesses’ cap-and-trade compliance levels 
may be difficult to compare, and thus police.208  
 Furthermore, market participants may not realize which businesses 
consistently purchase large quantities of allowances or pay fines for 
noncompliance.209 Although companies that pay fines or purchase 
large numbers of allowances comply with cap-and-trade laws,210 such 
behavior is not consistent with the purpose behind the legislation—to 
promote a greener and more sustainable environment.211 Because 
businesses do not provide clear and uniform disclosures of cap-and-
trade impacts to the market, market participants will not be able to po-
lice such companies.212 Changes in business behavior will not occur 
unless shareholders understand the business’s attitude toward pollu-
tion.213  
 Ultimately, the lack of information available to market participants 
results in a lost opportunity for increasing the effectiveness of cap-and-
trade regulation in relation to its underlying policy goals.214 Market par-
ticipants may be helpful in pressuring companies to develop operations 
that reduce emissions, consistent with the spirit of cap-and-trade legisla-
tion.215 Although cap-and-trade regulators can ensure compliance with 
the law,216 market participants may help to promote the internalization 
of the cost of pollution to companies.217 Such market pushback against 
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excessively polluting corporations could have a real impact on decreas-
ing emissions.218  
 For markets to police companies, however, there must be uniform 
and transparent disclosure of cap-and-trade’s impact on businesses’ fi-
nancial statements.219 The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) initia-
tive will hopefully provide a solution to this issue.220 In evaluating any 
system of allowance accounting, one must keep the ultimate goals of 
GHG cap-and-trade in mind.221  
 The next section presents a proposal for balance sheet disclosure 
of cap-and-trade allowances, illustrating a method of transparent disclo-
sure that would accomplish this goal. The proposal involves classifying 
allowances as assets, measured at fair market value.222 It also suggests 
classifying emissions that exceed currently-held allowance thresholds as 
“Accrued Expenses” until fines are paid or allowances are purchased.223  
A. A Transparent System: Allowances as Assets, and Pollution over Allowance 
Amounts as Accrued Expenses 
 Companies should classify currently held allowances as assets on 
the balance sheet.224 A company will derive future benefits from hold-
ing an allowance because the allowance will enable it to produce a cer-
tain amount of GHGs in the production of goods and services.225 When 
the production process necessarily involves the emission of GHGs, the 
allowance benefits the company by letting it bring products to the mar-
ket.226 Such an allowance can be categorized as an asset. Further, many 
cap-and-trade programs let companies freely trade allowances, such 
that a company could gain from selling an allowance at a different 
price from when it was purchased.227 Therefore, allowances not only 
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provide value to a company by enabling it to continue to produce 
goods and services, but also by serving as quasi-investments which can 
be traded when not needed.228 
 When a company purchases an allowance on the emissions trading 
market, it should increase its “Allowance Asset” account and decrease 
the “Cash” or “Payable Account.”229 The company should value the ini-
tial purchase at acquisition cost, fixing the dollar amount of the “Allow-
ance Asset” account at the dollar amount of the cash outlay required to 
purchase the allowance.230 Furthermore, when a company uses an al-
lowance by emitting the quantity of pollution authorized, the “Allow-
ance Asset” must be decreased to reflect the reduction in the asset.231 
Recording a corresponding allowance expense will decrease net in-
come, forcing companies to list the costs of pollution on the income 
statement.232  
 Financial statements are most useful when they present accurate 
information.233 Accordingly, companies should make year-end adjust-
ments to the carrying value of “Allowance Asset” accounts to fair mar-
ket value.234 When the price of an allowance increases in the emissions 
trading market over the prior year’s value, the “Allowance Asset” should 
increase by the difference between the prices, with a corresponding 
increase in the equity account “Unrealized Gain on Allowance.”235 Mak-
ing these adjustments will ensure companies record allowances at fair 
market value.236 
 When a company sells an allowance, the “Allowance Asset” account 
must be decreased by the dollar amount of the sale to reflect the 
                                                                                                                      
228 See id. at 18. 
229 See, e.g., Dyckman et al., supra note 114, at 568 (describing accounting procedures 
for the purchase of an asset). 
230 See Stickney & Weil, supra note 115, at 45. 
231 See Dyckman et al., supra note 114, at 550 (indicating that assets can be viewed as 
“economic service[s] . . . to be consumed over time in the earning of revenues”). This can 
be accomplished by debiting the “Allowance Expense” account and crediting the “Allow-
ance Asset” account. See id. at 75 (describing the process for reducing the carrying value of 
an asset and the corresponding expense). 
232 See Stickney & Weil, supra note 115, at 11 (indicating that expenses decrease net 
income and must be reported on the income statement). 
233 See id. at 790 (discussing the benefits of accurately presenting financial informa-
tion). 
234 See id. at 600 (describing adjustments of investment assets to market value). 
235 See id. Alternatively, if the price of an allowance has decreased, an “Unrealized Loss 
on Allowance” account should be debited and the “Allowance Asset” should be credited. 
See id.  
236 See id. 
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change in benefits held by the company.237 If adjustments have been 
made to mark the “Allowance Asset” account to fair market value, the 
“Unrealized Gain on Allowance” account should be decreased and a 
“Realized Gain on Allowance” recognized instead.238 Realized gains and 
losses on allowance assets will impact net income, whereas unrealized 
gains and losses will affect other comprehensive income on the income 
statement.239 
 A company should recognize an accrued expense in situations 
where the company emits more carbon than its current allowance hold-
ings will permit.240 The financial statements would then accurately pre-
sent a company’s true financial position at year end because the cap-
and-trade regulator will force the company to either pay a fine or pur-
chase more allowances on the market.241 Recognition of an accrued 
expense will enable the company to record this required future cash 
outlay in the period in which the event causing the need for the ex-
pense actually occurred.242 The company would recognize in the pre-
sent that it will need to purchase allowances in the future.243 
 Accordingly, a company that exceeded emissions levels authorized 
by its currently held allowances should record an increase to a “Pollu-
tion Fine Expense” account and a decrease to a “Pollution Fine Pay-
able” account.244 The accounts should be valued at the cost of the fine 
the company would be required to pay to the regulator should it not be 
                                                                                                                      
237 Id. at 56. In addition to decreasing an asset account, a cash or receivable account 
should be increased to reflect the money that the firm has received from purchasers. See id. 
238 See Stickney & Weil, supra note 115, at 600. Alternatively, if the “Allowance Asset” 
account has been adjusted down to fair market value, a “Loss on Allowance” account 
should be debited and the “Unrealized Loss on Allowance” account should be credited. See 
id. 
239 See id. at 674–75. 
240 See Dyckman et al., supra note 114, at 72–74 (describing accrued expenses); cf. 
Ernst & Young, supra note 11, at 6 (“[T]he entity generally does not record an obligation 
to deliver emissions credits to the regulatory agency until the actual level of emissions for a 
given period exceeds the credits held on the balance sheet.”). 
241 See Dyckman et al., supra note 114, at 72 (describing the importance of accruals to 
the accuracy of financial statements); Ernst & Young, supra note 11, at 2 (describing the 
company’s need to either purchase allowances or pay a fine, should emissions exceed the 
limits corresponding to currently held allowances). 
242 See Dyckman et al., supra note 114, at 72–73. 
243 See id. at 73. 
244 See id. at 72–74 (describing accrued expenses); Ernst & Young, supra note 11, at 6. 
The “Pollution Fine Payable” account is a liability, because it represents the company’s 
future obligation to pay the fine resulting from its current excess pollution. See Stickney 
& Weil, supra note 115, at 66 (indicating that payable accounts are liabilities). 
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able to secure needed allowances.245 If the company purchases allow-
ances to cover its excessive pollution, it can reverse its original account-
ing entry by decreasing “Pollution Fine Payable” and increasing “Pollu-
tion Fine Expense.”246 If the company ultimately decides to pay the fine 
instead of securing more allowances, it may record that loss as a de-
crease in “Pollution Fine Payable” and “Cash” to represent payment of 
the fine.247 Pollution fine expenses will immediately decrease net in-
come,248 while cash outlays related to purchasing allowances will not 
impact the income statement until the allowances are used.249 
B. A Solution to the Problem: The Transparent System 
 The proposed transparent accounting system will increase the ef-
fectiveness of cap-and-trade legislation. Providing a uniform method of 
accounting that brings transparency to cap-and-trade financial informa-
tion250 gives market participants increased ability to evaluate a com-
pany, potentially increasing the private policing of polluting busi-
nesses.251 With this information, analysts may easily compare usage of 
allowances between companies,252 and will be able to identify compa-
nies that must pay fines for violations of cap-and-trade laws.253 Market 
actors will be able to hold polluting companies accountable for their 
actions and will have a concrete basis to demand change.254 
                                                                                                                      
245 See Ernst & Young, supra note 11, at 6. I posit that valuing the expense at the cost 
of a future fine, as opposed to the cost of purchasing allowances, is most in keeping with 
accounting’s commitment to conservatism, since companies cannot guarantee that they 
will be able to purchase allowances from either the government or a private seller in the 
future. See Dyckman et al., supra note 114, at 45 (describing conservatism). 
246 See Stickney & Weil, supra note 115, at 66 (indicating that payable accounts are li-
abilities). 
247 See id. at 52 (indicating that most liabilities require payment of cash). 
248 See id. at 11 (indicating that expenses decrease net income). 
249 See supra notes 240–241 and accompanying text. When allowances are used, the al-
lowance asset is decreased and an allowance expense is recognized on the income state-
ment. See supra notes 240–241 and accompanying text. 
250 See Stickney & Weil, supra note 115, at 20 (describing the need for uniformity in 
selecting accounting methods to improve clarity in financial statements). 
251 See Bartels, supra note 5, at 333 (describing shareholders’ ability to push for envi-
ronmental reform). 
252 Cf. Ragan & Stagliano, supra note 4, at 56 (describing problems with the adequacy 
of financial statements when identical companies make different disclosures). 
253 See supra notes 244–249 and accompanying text (describing the impact of fines on 
the income statement). 
254 See Bartels, supra note 5, at 333 (describing shareholders’ ability to push for envi-
ronmental reform). 
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 In addition to facilitating market access to information, the ac-
counting system itself may impact the company because it may change 
its operations to appear financially sound.255 Foremost, forcing compa-
nies to recognize and separately disclose pollution fine and allowance 
expenses will have a direct impact on net income.256 While a decrease 
in net income itself is likely to draw the attention of shareholders,257 
incentive-based compensation to executives will also decrease.258 Thus, 
when corporate decision makers stand to lose significant portions of 
their compensation, they may be more likely to ensure compliance with 
the spirit of cap-and-trade laws.259 Management response may include 
investment to reduce the amount of allowances necessary, thus avoid-
ing fines and related expenses on their income statement.260  
 Moreover, because this accounting methodology calls for quantita-
tively displaying allowances on financial statements,261 it forces compa-
nies to internalize the costs of GHG emissions.262 By assigning a dollar 
amount to the emitted pollution, even companies that pollute within 
their allowance range may be forced to recognize the extent to which 
they harm the environment.263 If allowance expenses substantially de-
crease a company’s profits, then the company may be polluting more 
than the total social utility of its goods.264 Companies that must pur-
chase large quantities of allowances may be unable to remain competi-
tive as a result.265 In this way, allowance accounting can help market 
actors take into account the social utility of an enterprise and its impact 
on the environment. 
                                                                                                                      
255 See Stickney & Weil, supra note 115, at 21 (describing efficient capital markets as 
reacting quickly to financial information when valuing stocks). 
256 See supra notes 233–255 and accompanying text. 
257 See generally Stickney & Weil, supra note 115, at 12 (discussing net income as indi-
cating a firm’s accomplishments relative to expenses). 
258 See supra notes 131–147 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra notes 131–147 and accompanying text. 
260 See supra notes 131–147 and accompanying text. 
261 See supra notes 224–249 and accompanying text. 
262 See Bartels, supra note 5, at 304 (discussing the goal of holding “management ac-
countable for their actions”). 
263 See supra notes 233–262 and accompanying text. 
264 See Cong. Budget Office, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that “higher allowance prices 
could lead to greater-than-expected reductions in profits”). 
265 See Ass’n of Wash. Cities, supra note 22, at 2. 
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Conclusion 
 As cap-and-trade programs increase in popularity around the 
world, pressure on the U.S. government to pass federal greenhouse gas 
emissions trading legislation continues to build. Whether the United 
States implements such a system, emissions trading abroad has become 
an accepted part of international business. With several recent propos-
als for a federal cap-and-trade program and new regional emissions 
trading initiatives, it appears that wide-scale emissions trading regimes 
may be law in the United States in the near future. Furthermore, the 
interdependent nature of the global economy ensures that U.S. busi-
nesses will face accounting for emissions in foreign emissions trading 
regimes. 
 The accuracy of accounting information is essential to uphold the 
integrity of global financial systems, and therefore non-voluntary, non-
discretionary accounting standards must be established. Although cur-
rent SEC regulations describe procedures for reporting locations, de-
scriptions, and assessments of risk, they do not specify a standard 
measurement methodology. Voluntary reporting regimes provide some 
guidance on accounting methods, but ultimately do not create the uni-
form, authoritative standards needed. 
 Cap-and-trade regulations will be most effective when allowances 
appear as assets on the balance sheet, and pollution in excess of allow-
ances appears as accrued expenses. Presenting a company’s financial 
position according to this method will hold companies most account-
able to the investing public. Under this proposal, allowance trading 
may impact net income, potentially incentivizing increased manager 
responsiveness to the goals of cap-and-trade programs. This method 
would also cause companies to internalize the costs of pollution. Re-
quiring companies to accurately account for emissions trading is one of 
the best ways to ensure true compliance with any cap-and-trade system. 
